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Abstract.  Use of knowledge-based planning tools can help alleviate the challenges of planning a military 
operation in a coalition environment. We explore these challenges and potential contributions of 
knowledge-based tools using as an example the CADET system, a knowledge-based tool capable of 
producing automatically (or with human guidance) battle plans with realistic degree of detail and 
complexity. In ongoing experiments, it compared favorably with human planners. Interleaved planning, 
scheduling, routing, attrition and consumption processes comprise the computational approach of this 
tool. From the coalition operations perspective, such tools offer an important aid in rapid 
synchronization of assets and actions of heterogeneous assets belonging to multiple organizations, 
potentially with distinct doctrine and rules of engagement. In this paper, we discuss the functionality of 
the tool, provide a brief overview of the technical approach and experimental results, and outline the 
potential value of such tools for coalition operations. 
 
1.   Overview 
Influential voices in the US military community (Wass de Czege and Biever, 2001) argue for significant 
computerization of the military planning process and for "...fast new planning processes that establish a new division of 
labor between man and machine. Staffs will rely heavily upon software to complete the straightforward calculations. 
Decision aids will quickly offer suggestions and test alternative courses of actions." Although the reasons for 
introducing such a computerization in the military planning processes are compelling enough even in the context of a 
single-nation military, many of the same reasons become even more pronounced in a coalition environment: 
 The process of planning a military operation remains relatively cumbersome, inflexible and slow even when 
conducted by a planning staff that trained together extensively in order to achieve common understanding of the 
collaborative procedures, approaches and ontology. In a coalition context, the planning staff rarely has the benefits 
of extensive joint training, and comes into the process with significantly different sets of procedures, terminology, 
and doctrines (Riscassi, 1993).   
 The planning process frequently involves significant disagreements on estimation of outcomes, attrition, 
consumption of supplies, and enemy reactions. Much of these disagreements arise from differences in mental 
models and underlying assumptions of the process participants. Such differences are further exacerbated in planning 
performed by a coalition staff (Elron et. al., 1999).   
 There is a fundamental complexity of synchronization and effective utilization of multiple heterogeneous assets 
performing numerous, inter-dependent, heterogeneous tasks. This complexity, heterogeneity and the need for 
careful coordination and synchronization inevitably grow in a coalition environment, particularly for the ground 
component.    
We argue that using an effective decision aid can, in 
part, alleviate these challenges. As an example, 
consider CADET, a tool for producing automatically 
(or with human guidance) Army battle plans with 
realistic degree of detail and complexity. In ongoing 
experiments, it compared favorably with human planners. 
Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the U. S. Army 
or any agency of the U.S. government. 
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Figure 1  CADET takes a sketch and statement as an input, and produces 
detailed schedules of hundreds of tasks, usage of resources, risks and 
losses, actions of the enemy, and routing. 
In brief, the human planner defines the key goals for a tactical course of action (COA), and CADET expands them into a 
detailed plan/schedule of the operation. CADET expands friendly tasks, determines the necessary supporting relations, 
allocates / schedules tasks to friendly assets, takes into account dependencies between tasks and availability of assets, 
predicts enemy actions and reactions, devises friendly counter-actions, estimates paths of movements, timing 
requirements, attrition and risk.  CADET is a generic engine, not specific to any type of assets or tasks. Although 
currently it is fitted with a US Army-specific task model, it can be readily augmented with models for other forces and 
nations, a clear requirement for coalition warfare. 
Recently, there were several efforts to utilize the planning capability introduced by CADET. For example, US Army 
Battle Command Battle Lab-Leavenworth (BCBL-L) chose CADET as the centerpiece for its Integrated COA Critiquing 
and Evaluation System (ICCES) program to provide task expansion for maneuver COAs created with sketching tools 
and plan developers. 
DARPA applied CADET in its Command Post of the Future (CPoF) program as a tool to provide a maneuver course of 
action. Under the umbrella of the CPoF program, CADET was integrated with the FOX GA system (Hayes and 
Schlabach, 1998) to provide a more detailed planner, coupled with COA generation capability. Battle Command Battle 
Lab-Huachuca (BCBL-H) integrated CADET with All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L) to provide a planner for 
intelligence assets and to wargame enemy COAs against friendly COAs. 
The development of Course of Action Display and Evaluation Tool (CADET) began in 1996, at the Carnegie Group, 
Inc. under the funding available under the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program. With numerous other 
efforts addressing various aspects of the military decision-making process (MDMP), we sought to concentrate our 
efforts on the COA analysis phase of the MDMP.     
In a setting such as a US Army divisional planning cell, the detailed analysis of a tactical course of action involves a 
staff of 3-4 persons with in-depth knowledge of both friendly and enemy tactics.  Working as a team, they ascertain the 
feasibility of the COA, to assess its likelihood of success against a particular enemy COA, and to identify the points of 
the COA requiring synchronized action for participants.  The resulting analysis is usually recorded in a matrix format, 
with time periods for the columns and functional alignment, such as the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS), for the 
rows (Field Manual 101-5).  Comparable, although not necessarily identical elements exist in decision-making processes 
of other nations’ military establishments, and will be undoubtedly found, formally or informally, in any coalition 
decision-making. 
2.   Challenges and Capabilities 
A planning tool for coalition warfare must provide 
numerous capabilities to address a number of key 
challenges. Such capabilities fall into several 
broad categories: 
 Modeling of assets and tasks 
 Adversarial environment 
 Coordinating team efforts 
 Autonomous action 
 
In this section, we explore some examples of such 
capabilities and their possible relations to coalition 
operations, from a functional, domain-oriented 
perspective. 
Modeling of assets and tasks 
Coalitions bring together military assets with 
different capabilities and employment doctrines. 
All too often, a coalition includes members whose assets, capabilities and tactics are not particularly familiar to other 
members. Thus, any decision aid for coalition planning must allow flexible, inexpensive, and rapid modeling of assets 
and associated tasks.  
 3
 
Figure 2  One of the COA-editing tools that have been used as data-entry 
interfaces to CADET and an example of a sketch produced with the tool. 
 
Let us consider the evolution of modeling the air assets in CADET as an example. Initially, we started with a very 
simple modeling that calculated deployment/re-deployment times and time-on-station, but with flat rates applied to 
resource consumption and timing considerations. 
As the modeling evolved, we captured the variations caused by a variety of different aspects of the employment cycle.  
For example, working with the Battle Command Battle Lab-Huachuca, we performed a detailed breakdown of the sub-
tasks involved in readying, launching and positioning a UAV.  The possibility of concurrent tasks was factored in where 
the UAV could be routed to collect intelligence along the ingress/egress route. 
The impact of the UAV use on the ground maneuver plan was greater than originally expected.  Subject matter experts 
(SME) had predicted the ground commander would use the UAVs primarily to verify known or suspected information.  
Further analysis revealed a prejudice toward UAVs by the older generation based on experience with weather-
constrained Army aviation and a tendency to focus on operations within their immediate control. Younger officers, 
however, employed UAVs as a primary source for intelligence, integrating them fully into the intelligence collection 
plan. 
CADET added a new dimension to the modeling of UAV by showing the demands of continuous coverage.  Users had 
generally planned individual missions or multiple 
missions.  Few of them had considered the full 
implications of putting continuous coverage on a 
target.  Army attack helicopters address this by 
using one of three modes: attack by platoon, attack 
by company or simultaneous attack. 
A unit with a limited number of UAVs must factor 
in travel and recovery time for the cycling UAVs 
to determine if continuous coverage is feasible.  
Users were generally discounting the cost of the 
recovery time (for refueling and preventive 
maintenance) when calculating the amount of time 
the UAVs were effectively available for on-site 
observation. 
As this example illustrates, an approach to 
modeling of assets must take into account at least 
the following considerations: (a) it must provide 
for rapid, inexpensive insertion of an initial, 
coarse but serviceable model; (b) allow for 
gradual increase in the model's fidelity, with incremental modifications even in a field environment, and (c) recognize 
and accommodate significant differences between organizations, as well as the ongoing evolution, in approaches to 
asset's employment. 
Adversarial environment 
Assumptions and expectations regarding the enemy are particularly challenging in a coalition, where the doctrine of staff 
officers from multiple nations can differ significantly and the political and strategic aims of the participating nations 
may be at odds (Riscassi 1993). 
 Manual wargaming typically depicts the enemy in a situation template, literally a standard tactical formation adapted to 
a specific piece of terrain in a given situation.  Modeling the enemy over time, then, is a matter of taking the standard 
formations and moving them along the avenues of approach toward the friendly force.   
In practice, there are several aspects in considering how the enemy affects friendly actions. In particular, every action 
taken by either combatant is likely to cause a reaction by the opponent and it might be possible to negate the reaction 
with the appropriate counteraction. Further, a quick, reliable Conflict Resolution Model (CRM) is needed to determine 
the effects of each engagement on the combatants. 
Action/reaction/counter-action 
Every action possible by either friendly or enemy units warrants examination for potential reactions.  This is augmented 
with further analysis to determine if there exists a counter-action that can be used to minimize the impact of the reaction 
or negate its effects completely. 
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Figure 3   CADET estimates personnel and weapon systems attrition 
mimicking the evaluations performed by Army’s experts. 
 
 
Figure 4  CADET modifies the start of the Seize activity, to occur 
after all necessary derived activities end. 
 
For example, whenever artillery is fired, the opposing force will attempt to locate the firing piece and fire counter-
battery fire. The firing unit must either be prepared to relocate or expect to receive incoming fire.  The general effect is 
to reduce harassing and interdicting fires whenever a credible counter-battery threat is present. The potential counter-
action is for the firing unit that fired first to conduct counter-battery operations of its own. In fact, US forces have 
sometimes fired in hopes of drawing the enemy into counter-battery fire for the explicit purpose of destroying the enemy 
artillery through counter-battery fire.  In a coalition environment, a planning tool must allow for multiple and readily 
adjustable models of such action-reaction-counteraction, to reflect diverse perspectives and expectations of the coalition 
members.  
Conflict Resolution Modeling (CRM) 
Although the approach of Dupuy (1990) offers 
many advantages for application in a system 
like CADET, the modest demands on the 
required data being one of them, we found that 
it produced results that were not in concert 
with those expected by the users. Having 
involved expert panels of military officers, 
both active duty and retired, we modified the 
equations and coefficients provided in 
(Dupuy, 1990) to match the expertise and 
experience of current practitioners (Kott, 
Ground and Langston, 1999). In a coalition 
planning process, it may be desirable to be 
able to either select from a library of multiple models, or to modify rapidly an existing one in a manner that takes into 
account the perspectives and experiences of the coalition members (Elron et. al., 1999).   
Coordinating team efforts 
Coordinating timing and movement 
Coalition warfare exacerbates the need for careful, thoughtful coordination of temporal and spatial aspects of all tasks 
within an operation.  Field Manual 3-0, the US Army’s keystone manual for operations, states “Detailed war-gaming, 
planning and rehearsals help develop a common understanding of the operation plan and control measures (Field Manual 
3-0).” CADET’s users can input temporal relationships for high-level activities for a plan.  Subject matter expert and 
user feedback provided us with important information concerning the way a commander conceives the temporal 
relations between activities.  For example, does an attack in an area start when the unit starts moving to the specified 
area, when the unit attacks the targeted unit, or when the unit enters the specified area? 
In CADET, this problem is solved by identifying what we call anchor points for each activity. When the user says that 
two specified activities should start at the same time, he or she has a specific idea about which derived activities they 
want the units to be starting at the same time. Users were 
typically less concerned with the time at which a unit 
starts moving and more interested in each unit first makes 
contact with the enemy.  For example, when performing 
a Seize, the start anchor point is the first movement in the 
area being seized. When performing a Close-with-and-
engage, the start anchor point is the first attack on any 
target unit.  In coalition operations, however, it is likely 
that officers from different doctrinal backgrounds will 
have different notions about such anchor points. This is 
yet another aspect of knowledge engineering in systems 
like CADET that requires a mechanism for rapid, in-field 
modifications.          
Coordinating supporting relationships 
The common errors encountered in manual COA analysis include failure to fully utilize resources, committing resources 
to provide support when they are not within range, and over-committing resources. 
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Figure 5  CADET works interactively with the user to identify 
questionable activities. 
 
Clearly, these errors would be even more likely to occur in a COA analysis process performed by a coalition staff. 
CADET's planning and scheduling algorithm ensures resources are allocated within constraints and are not over-
committed.  In those cases when the algorithm is unable to find a solution without an over-commitment of resources, 
CADET identifies the affected activity as questionable (e.g., Fig. 5), but continues the planning process. This allows the 
user to accept or correct the over-commitment of resources when a more complete solution is available for review and 
decision-making.  
CADET tracks the utilization of resources to allow users to know where resources are not being fully exploited, a 
capability that can be used to look for places where resources could be applied elsewhere.  
CADET looks at the effective range of supporting resources, such as logistics facilities, to determine if they are close 
enough to achieve the mission.  For instance, CADET models the actual movement of support elements between the 
field trains and combat units.  As the combat elements move forward in the offense, and the distances and the time 
required to perform re-supply increases as well.  When it becomes too great to support the planned level of tactical 
operations, CADET cues the planner to reposition the field trains forward to a closer location.  If the trains cannot be 
repositioned in a timely manner, CADET identifies the restrictions imposed on the combat unit by the reduced level of 
support. By taking care of such details, CADET can help the coalition staff avoid the typical mistakes of resource 
management in COA analysis. 
Operating in three dimensions 
In practice, human planners tend to focus exclusively on 
the close fight, without due consideration to the full depth 
of the battlespace.  For example, leaders who lack 
experience with US Army attack helicopters tend to 
discount their value or leave them out of the equation 
completely.     
 A deep attack will normally cause serious attrition for the 
enemy but carries with it the risk of friendly losses.  If 
Army attack helicopters are lost behind enemy lines, it 
necessitates a combat search and rescue (CSAR) mission.  
On the other hand, a deep attack could reduce the enemy 
strength to the point where the enemy is forced to call off 
the attack.  Whenever assets are available, a deep attack 
should be considered.  The coalition staff officers can take advantage of CADET’s ability to analyze air attacks to build 
in COAs with air assets, where air and ground assets may belong to different coalition members. 
Autonomous action 
In the context of coalition warfare, even more so than in single-nation warfare, guidance from the commander should 
often come in the form of his intent or the desired results (Keithly and Ferris, 1999).   
Modeling tasks based on intent 
The bypass criterion in CADET provides the ability for units to disengage when the opposing force has been attrited to a 
certain level.  However, it does not address the more general situation encountered where actions are initiated with a 
specific intent in mind.  For instance, in economy of force operations, the supporting attack will generally not be able to 
destroy or even to defeat the enemy.  Rather, the intent of the supporting attack is to ensure the success of the main 
effort, regardless of the extent to which the supporting effort is able to defeat the enemy. 
Artillery fire commonly has an associated intent.  Artillery will be used to suppress, to mask, to defeat, or to destroy.  By 
extending the task set to include the intent, the applicability of the tasks to specific situations was greatly enhanced. 
Modeling for deliberate attack is an excellent example of intent and its effect on resource consumption.  In CADET, the 
task is modeled to allow the projection of attrition for attacks that are not attempting to completely remove the enemy 
(i.e. Attack to Attrit). The effect is a change to attack duration, and ultimately a modification to total defender and 
attacker attrition. For a planner, the need to hold the friendly strength at or above a certain threshold might be key to the 
analysis of a particular COA. 
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Figure 6  A typical plan/schedule of a brigade-sized offensive 
operation may include hundreds of significant tasks. A 
fragment of such a plan is shown here. 
 
Derived actions for subordinates based on higher level tasks 
A coalition operation consists of a large number of disparate, unique sub-tasks working to achieve a common goal.  To 
properly model the task requires modeling a variable number of sub-tasks.  The timing and interaction of the sub-tasks 
determines the success or failure of the task.  Of particular interest is the assignment of tasks and routes to units that are 
not fully identified by the user. 
A counter-attack is a good example.   The commander will attempt to commit the counter-attack force at the time 
necessary to reverse the trend of the defense.  The problem is that the exact speed and route of the attacking force can 
generally not be predicted in advance. The counter-attack force will be most effective if it is able to strike a flank. 
CADET automatically calculates the route and timing for the counter-attack force’s movement.  In a deliberate planning 
mode, this allows time to perform route reconnaissance. In a real-time execution-replanning cycle, the ability to rapidly 
calculate routes and related timing would facilitate identification of the decision point for commitment. 
Movement to contact, another good example, represents a significantly harder challenge.  The main body deploys a 
small security force to establish the initial contact, followed closely by a larger security force.  The intent is to make the 
initial contact with the smallest possible force that can develop the situation.  The unit making the initial contact 
attempts to determine the size, composition and intentions of the enemy force.  The unit commander must make the 
initial determination whether to bypass the enemy, avoid contact (if possible), engage directly, or assist the effort of the 
main body. 
CADET uses rules to determine the actions of the security elements.  Each individual element follows the rules to decide 
its actions on contact.  These actions ripple through the team.  For instance, if the lead security element encounters a 
particularly strong enemy force that meets the criteria for an attack by the main body, the lead security element will: 
 Engage the enemy in direct fire. 
 Determine the best route and point for employment 
for the following security body.   
 Determine the possible routes for the main body 
attack for consideration by the commander. 
 Secure the flank opposite the following security 
body.  
The ability to derive the tasks of the subordinate elements as 
a result of rules-based task expansion and situational 
analysis is a critical aspect of CADET’s planning function. 
In a coalition environment, this capability helps provide an 
objective basis for systematically identifying and allocating 
tasks to assets of multiple members.  
3.   Technical Approach 
Let us consider briefly how CADET addresses some of the technical challenges implicit in the capabilities discussed 
above. 
The integration of planning and scheduling is achieved via an algorithm for tightly interleaved incremental planning and 
scheduling. The HTN-like planning step produces an incremental group of tasks by applying domain-specific 
“expansion” rules to those activities in the current state of the plan that require hierarchical decomposition. The 
scheduling step performs temporal constraint propagation (both lateral and vertical within the hierarchy) and schedules 
the newly added activities to the available resources and time periods (Kott, 1992; Sadeh, 1996; Kott, Ground and Budd, 
2002).  
The same interleaving mechanism is also used to integrate incremental steps of routing, attrition and consumption 
estimate. For estimates of attrition, we developed a special version of the Dupuy algorithm (Kott, Ground and Langston, 
1999) that was calibrated with respect to estimates of military professionals, US Army officers. This attrition calculation 
can be replaced with other methods, when employed in a coalition environment. 
The adversarial aspects of the planning-scheduling problem are addressed via the same incremental decomposition 
mechanism. In particular, the tool automatically infers (using its knowledge base and using the same expansion 
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Figure 8  The results of experiments approximated as 
normal distributions: the judges were asked to grade 
the products of CADET and manual process on a 
scale of 0 to 10. 
 
 
Figure 7  This sketch was used in one of the experiments 
performed with CADET. 
 
technique used for HTN planning) possible reactions and counteractions, and provides for resources and timing 
necessary to incorporate them into the overall plan. In effect, this follows the military action/reaction/counter-action 
analysis.  
In spite of significant functionality, the algorithms of CADET provide high performance. On a modern but not 
exceptionally fast laptop, a typical run – generation of a complete detailed plan from a high-level COA – takes about 20 
seconds. With the coalition planning process taking longer than single-nation planning, which is already considered too 
slow, the ability to perform multiple, rapid iterations of computerized planning is very important (Riscassi, 1993).  
The knowledge base of CADET is structured for simplicity and low cost. In practice, the most expensive (in terms of 
development and maintenance costs) part of the KB is the rules responsible for expansion (decomposition) of activities. 
CADET includes a module for KB maintenance that allows a non-programmer to add new units of knowledge or over-
write the old ones. This is critical in a coalition environment, where the knowledge base must be rapidly extended in 
field conditions, to accommodate assets and rules associated with new coalition members.  
From the perspective of integration with other systems, the 
rigorous separation – both architectural and conceptual - of 
problem solving components from user interaction 
mechanisms, allows for integration with a variety of user-
interface paradigms and systems. The extensive use of 
XML enables simple, inexpensive integration with a variety 
of heterogeneous systems, a significant advantage in 
environments where members of a coalition bring with 
them a variety of systems (Thomas, 2000).  
4.   Experimental Comparisons – 
CADET vs. Manual Approaches 
A recent experiment, one of several series (Rasch, Kott and 
Forbus, 2002; Kott, Ground and Budd, 2002), involved five 
different scenarios and nine judges (active duty officers of 
US military, mainly of colonel and lieutenant colonel 
ranks).  The five scenarios were obtained from several 
exercises conducted by US Army. The scenarios were all 
brigade-sized and offensive, but still differed significantly 
in terrain, mix of friendly forces, nature of opposing forces, 
and scheme of maneuver. For each scenario/COA we were 
able to locate the COA sketches assigned to each planning 
staff, and the synchronization matrices produced by each 
planning staff.  The participants, experienced observers of 
many planning exercises, estimated that these typically are 
performed by a team of 4-5 officers, over the period of 3-4 hours, amounting to a total of about 16 person-hours per 
planning product.  
Using the same scenarios and COAs, we used the CADET tool to generate a detailed plan and to express it in the form 
of a synchronization matrices. The matrices were then reviewed and edited by a surrogate user, a retired US Army 
officer. The editing was rather light – in all cases it involved changing or deleting no more than 2-3% of entries on the 
matrix.  This reflected the fact that CADET is not expected to be used purely automatically, but rather in collaboration 
with a human decision-maker. The time to generate these products involved less than 2 minutes of CADET execution, 
and about 20 minutes of review and post-editing, for a total of about 0.4 person-hours per product.  The resulting 
matrices were transferred to the Excel spreadsheet and given the 
same visual style at that of human-generated sets.  
The products of both the CADET system and of human staff were 
organized into packages and submitted to the nine judges. Each 
package consisted of a sketch, statement, synchronization matrix and 
a questionnaire with grading instructions.  The judges were not told 
whether any of the planning products were produced by the 
traditional manual process or with the use of any computerized aids.   
 8
To avoid evaluation biases, assignments of packages to judges were fully randomized. Each judge was asked to evaluate 
four packages. Each judge was asked to review a package and grade the products contained in the package. 
The results demonstrate very little difference between CADET’s and human performance.  In particular, based on the 
mean of grades, CADET lost in two of the five scenarios, won in two, and one was an exact draw. Taking the mean of 
grades for all five scenarios, CADET earned 4.2, and humans earned 4.4, with the standard deviation of about 2.0, a very 
insignificant difference. 
The basic conclusion is clear: the judges gave CADET-produced products (which took typically about 20 minutes to 
produce) essentially the same level of grades as to the human-produced products (which took on the order of 16 person-
hours to produce).  
5.   The Coalition Perspective: Conclusions and Future Work 
A tool like CADET is applicable to a planning process where the planners are tasked with rapid synchronization of 
assets and actions of heterogeneous assets belonging to multiple organizations from multiple nations and services, 
potentially with distinct doctrines.  The assets that enter CADET’s problem solving process do not need to belong to one 
nation or service.  Instead, each asset, e.g., a unit of force, could have its own doctrine, capabilities and rules of 
engagement (ROE). It should be added that coalition planning often occurs at a higher level of abstraction, dealing with 
problem that are not limited to a single battle but rather a long-term campaign that must consider a broad range of 
actions and effects – political, military, economic, social, ideological, etc. (Kott and Corpac, 2007) Such breadth and 
complexity of a problem go well beyond the scope of CADET. 
The version of the HTN planning paradigm employed by CADET allows that a composite task is decomposed into 
lower-level subtasks by multiple different methods where the appropriate one is selected depending on which coalition 
resource would be applicable or assigned to the task. The object-oriented representation of tasks allows economical 
representation of nation-specific doctrinal variations applicable to the planning and execution of the task.  
The integrated planning-scheduling process allows the tool to pick and choose the best coalition force, based on 
applicability, availability and ROE even if the assets belong to different nations. The mechanisms for flexible human 
intervention provide opportunities for adjusting system's choices and guiding a system in selecting proper matches 
between multi-force tasks and resources. 
Officers belonging to different nations will need to modify or augment the knowledge base in accordance with their 
nation’s specific doctrine.  To this end, the CADET suite includes a mechanism that allows an end-user, a non-
programmer, to enter definitions and rules of tasks and store them in a user-specific segment of the knowledge base. 
Officers can define the knowledge in the field, in real time, even while the coalition is forming and the members are 
defining the constraints and rules of their participation.  
Coalition operations also highlight the need for a tool like CADET to allow collaborative, distributed work.  Staff 
officers will function over geographically dispersed areas, using their adapted version of CADET on a highly portable 
personal computing device. Each officer on the staff uses his copy of CADET to perform a slice of the overall planning 
task by (a) considering the partial plans that arrive electronically from other collaborating officers; (b) making 
reasonable assumptions when actual partial plans are not available; (c) issuing its own partial plans to other officers and 
highlighting inconsistencies, if any. Although currently CADET functions as a single-user tool, we are considering plans 
to extend the tool for multi-user, coalition-staff operations. 
At this time, CADET shows promise of reaching the state where a military decision-maker, a commander or a staff 
planner, uses it routinely as part of an integrated suite of tools to perform planning of tactical operations, to issue orders, 
and to monitor and modify the plans as the operation is executed and the situation evolves. It is not too far-fetched to 
suggest that such a tool may provide an 80% solution, under most situations, in a fraction of the time required for 
comparable manual staff planning products.  
However, CADET’s current state of capabilities also points toward the key gaps that must be overcome to realize the 
full potential of such tools in coalition warfare:  
The coalition planning process is particularly demanding on effective human-machine interfaces that can be used in spite 
of staff members’ differences in training and procedures.  Such interfaces remain elusive, especially for complex, multi-
dimensional information such as plans and execution of military operations, in high-tempo, high-stress, physically 
challenging environments.  Today’s common paradigms – map-based visualizations of spatial information and 
synchronization matrix for temporal visualization – are not necessarily the best approach, and different methods ought to 
be explored. 
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Presentation of the CADET’s products requires qualitatively different user interfaces and visualization mechanisms. Our 
experiments suggests that users had difficulties comprehending the synchronization matrix generated by the computer 
tool, even though it was presented in a very conventional, familiar manner. Perhaps, the synchronization matrix 
functions well only as a mechanism for short-hand recording of one’s own mental process and is not nearly as useful 
when used to present the results of someone else’s, e.g., a computer tool’s, reasoning process. 
Ongoing work on CADET technology focuses on closing these critical gaps. 
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